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Abstract 
Intergroup exchanges are an integral part of social life but are compromised when one 
group pursues its interests at another group’s expense. The present research investigates 
whether expressing emotion can mitigate the negative consequences of such actions. We 
examine how emotions communicated by either an ingroup or outgroup member following an 
ingroup member’s breach of trust affect other ingroup members’ feelings of guilt and pride, 
and subsequent allocation of resources. In both studies, groups of participants played a two-
round trust game with another group. In round one, they observed a member of their own 
group failing to reciprocate a trusting move by the outgroup. In Study 1 (N = 85), an 
outgroup member then communicated anger or disappointment, whereas in Study 2 (N = 
164), an ingroup member then communicated happiness or guilt. Comparisons with no-
emotion control conditions revealed that expressions of outgroup anger and ingroup guilt 
increased participants’ allocations to an outgroup member in round two. The effect of an 
outgroup member’s anger expression was mediated by participants’ diminished feelings of 
pride about the ingroup action, whereas the effect of an ingroup member’s guilt expression 
was mediated by participants’ own feelings of guilt. Taken together, these findings support a 
social appraisal approach and highlight the roles that pride and guilt can play in shaping 
intergroup resource allocations.  
Keywords: intergroup emotion, guilt, pride, resource allocation, appraisal 
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Intergroup Emotional Exchange: Ingroup Guilt and Outgroup Anger Increase 
Resource Allocation in Trust Games  
People are connected to others through a multitude of relationships which often 
involve exchanges of money, services, or other valuable resources. These transactions can 
take place between individuals, but also between groups – including companies, institutions, 
and countries. Justice, fairness, and trust play an essential role in such exchanges. In the 18th 
century, Adam Smith was one of the first economists to highlight their importance in his 
influential Theory of Moral Sentiments (1790/2005). A large body of contemporary research 
corroborates his classic account. Fairness and trust – defined as the willingness to make 
oneself vulnerable based on the belief that others can be relied upon – are critical factors in 
economic exchanges (Güth, Ockenfels, & Wendel, 1993; Rabin, 1993; Rotter, 1967), and are 
associated with personal and societal well-being (DeNeve & Cooper, 1998; Fukuyama, 
1996). The current research focuses on intergroup trust, which is harder to establish and 
easier to damage than trust between individuals (Ferrin, Bligh, & Kohles, 2007; Insko & 
Schopler, 1987; Polzer, 1996). Specifically, we study the consequences of one group failing 
to reciprocate another group’s trust and examine whether subsequent intergroup exchanges 
are influenced by emotion communication.  
Restoring Intergroup Trust 
Despite the positive outcomes of trust, and despite people’s strong propensity for 
cooperation and fairness (e.g., Gintis, 2000; Hamlin, Wynn, Bloom, & Mahajan, 2011), 
humans are also motivated to pursue their own selfish interests at the expense of other 
individuals or the interests of their own group at the expense of other groups. People 
systematically underestimate the severity of social as well as physical pain experienced by 
others (e.g., Nordgren, Banas, & MacDonald, 2011), and the greater the social distance from 
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these others, the more likely people are to cheat, steal money, exploit others, or sell faulty 
goods (e.g., Hoffman, McCabe & Smith, 1996).  
Such selfish transactions have a negative impact on subsequent exchanges (Fehr & 
Fischbacher, 2004). They are, however, especially damaging in intergroup settings, because 
such contexts tend to elicit stronger competitive tendencies than do relations between 
individuals (Folmer, Klapwijk, De Cremer, & Van Lange, 2012; Wildschut, Pinter, Vevea, 
Insko, & Schopler, 2003). People also expect competitive behavior in intergroup contexts, 
making it difficult to establish and restore trust (Insko et al., 1993). Accordingly, extant 
research documents the limited effectiveness of intergroup apologies (Hornsey & Wohl, 
2013; Nadler & Liviatan, 2006). Even if only one person causes harm, members of the victim 
group can still hold other members of the transgressor’s group responsible, because they 
perceive the perpetrating group as an entity rather than a collection of separate individuals 
(Insko et al., 1988). As a consequence, violations committed by one group member may lead 
to retaliatory behavior (a common response to unfairness, e.g., Bosman & van Winden, 2002; 
Brebels, De Cremer, & Sedikides, 2008) directed towards other members of the group, thus 
escalating intergroup conflict.  
An important question is whether and how cooperation between groups can be 
improved following such transgressions. The most straightforward method involves enacting 
less negative outgroup-directed behavior in future intergroup transactions, or even actively 
offering reparation for the harm done. Empirical evidence suggests that reparations help to 
reestablish cooperation after transgressions (Bottom, Gibson, Daniels, & Murnighan, 2002; 
De Cremer, 2010; Desmet, De Cremer, & Van Dijk, 2011). Individuals compensate for their 
own misdeeds in interpersonal settings (Berscheid & Walster, 1967; Regan, Williams, & 
Sparling, 1972), and may also do so if they feel responsible for transgressions committed by 
their group. Indeed, studies using intergroup contexts show that witnessing transgressions or 
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defections committed by ingroup members can motivate observers to compensate or make 
amends, especially if they identify with their group (Arora, Logg, & Larrick, 2015) or are 
observed by outgroup members (Gino, Gu, & Zhong, 2009). Such behaviors – as well as 
most economic decisions in mixed-motive situations – are typically embedded in a broader 
context and are therefore accompanied by other social signals.  
Emotional Influences on Resource Allocation 
Arguably, expressions of emotions accompanying resource-allocation decisions are 
among the most important of these signals because they convey information about the extent 
to which a given behavior is consistent with the allocator’s or receiver’s goals (Manstead & 
Fischer, 2001; Ortony, Clore, & Collins, 1988). For example, observing a person express 
regret after making an unfair allocation in a computer game increases the likelihood of 
participants making a fair offer themselves (van der Schalk, Kuppens, Bruder, & Manstead, 
2015). Similarly, people cooperate significantly more with individuals who express guilt or 
regret after unfair behavior in economic games (de Melo, Carnevale, Read, & Gratch, 2014; 
Shore & Parkinson, 2017).  These findings belong to a larger body of evidence demonstrating 
that emotions communicated in the context of economic exchanges shape receivers’ 
subsequent behaviors (e.g., DeSteno, Bartlett, Baumann, Williams, & Dickens, 2010; Moretti 
& di Pellegrino, 2010; Schwarz, 2000; van Kleef, de Dreu & Manstead, 2010; Zeelenberg, 
Nelissen, Breugelmans, & Pieters, 2008).  
But how do communicated emotions affect economic decisions? According to social 
appraisal accounts, people’s behaviors are guided not only by their own feelings and 
evaluations of a given situation but also by the ways in which other people appraise the same 
situation and react to it emotionally (Manstead & Fischer, 2001). Indeed, research documents 
that emotions displayed by an interaction partner influence observers’ event appraisals and 
emotions (e.g. de Melo et al., 2014; Parkinson & Simons, 2009). In mixed-motive situations 
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people may even engage in reverse appraisals, inferring the motives and intentions of a social 
partner from their facial expressions, and using these inferences to guide their own behavior 
(de Melo et al., 2014). Knowing how a social partner appraises a situation provides a strong 
foundation for predicting their likely actions (Schelling, 1960). However, emotions can also 
convey corresponding appraisals implicitly and affect perceivers’ behavior without the need 
for sophisticated reasoning about their meaning (e.g. Parkinson, Phiri, & Simons, 2012; 
Parkinson, 2011; Sorce, Emde, Campos, & Klinnert, 1985).     
Intergroup Emotions: The Role of Guilt and Pride 
It is possible to extend the social appraisal approach beyond interpersonal contexts to 
group processes, leading to the prediction that emotions expressed in an intergroup 
interaction can shape group members’ appraisals as well as their emotional reactions and 
subsequent behavior (Parkinson & Manstead, 2015). Consistent with this claim, studies 
examining intergroup relations, like the research in interpersonal contexts, indicate a central 
role for emotion (e.g., Harth, Kessler, & Leach, 2008; Harth, Leach, & Kessler, 2013; 
Lelieveld, Van Dijk, Van Beest, & Van Kleef, 2013; Maitner, Mackie, & Smith, 2007). 
Moreover, a growing body of evidence reveals that emotions can increase the effectiveness of 
intergroup apologies (Giner-Sorolla, Castano, Espinosa & Brown, 2008; Wohl, Hornsey, & 
Bennett, 2012) or mediate their influence on outcomes such as retribution and forgiveness 
(Leonard, Mackie, & Smith, 2011). In sum, intergroup emotions should influence both 
economic decisions and reactions to behavioral transgressions.  
For example, Lelieveld and colleagues (2013) examined how disappointment 
communicated by the recipient in a bargaining game affects the allocator’s emotions and 
behavior. When an ingroup recipient expressed disappointment, allocators felt more guilt and 
consequently sent more resources. However, when an outgroup recipient expressed 
disappointment, allocators felt less guilt and made lower offers. Similarly, a recent study 
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(Solak, Tagar, Cohen-Chen, Saguy, & Halperin, 2016) showed that outgroup disappointment 
increased participants’ willingness to engage in collective action protecting that outgroup. 
However, this effect was only observed when participants perceived the situation as 
illegitimate. Such findings demonstrate that emotions are embedded in broader relational 
contexts and that their consequences cannot be fully understood without reference to the 
surrounding situation (Harth et al., 2008; Leach, 2016).   
People may express emotions about the specific behavioral choices of ingroup and 
outgroup members as well as the outcomes they experience. Guilt and pride are especially 
important in the context of intergroup transgressions, because they imply contrasting 
reactions to the group-serving behavior of an ingroup member (Harth et al., 2008; Harth et 
al., 2013; Maitner et al., 2007). Focusing on benefits to the ingroup may lead group members 
to experience pride (Martens, Tracy, & Shariff, 2012), but focusing on the harm done to the 
outgroup and on the violation of moral standards may lead members to experience guilt (e.g., 
Baumeister, Stillwell, & Heatherton, 1994; Doosje, Branscombe, Spears, & Manstead, 1998).  
Correspondingly, pride or happiness expressed by an ingroup member may lead other group 
members to focus on benefits for the ingroup and consequently experience pride themselves, 
whereas guilt expressed by an ingroup member may lead other group members to focus on 
harm to the outgroup and consequently also to experience guilt. 
These emotions are also associated with different behavioral outcomes: Pride predicts 
increased perceptions of the legitimacy of the behavior (Harth et al., 2008) and a greater 
likelihood of engaging in the same actions (Tangney, Stuewig, & Mashek, 2007; van der 
Schalk, Bruder, & Manstead, 2012); guilt, on the other hand, has been linked with inhibition 
of ongoing behavior, and self-reflection (Amodio, Devine, & Harmon-Jones, 2007), as well 
as reparatory gestures and behaviors (Baumeister et al., 1994; Brown, Gonzalez, Zagefka, 
Manzi, & Cehajic, 2008; Tangney & Dearing, 2003). Group-based pride and guilt should 
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therefore predict behaviors following a transgression committed by the ingroup. Consistent 
with this reasoning, Harth and colleagues (2013) showed that being informed about the 
ingroup’s responsibility for protecting or damaging the environment influenced participants’ 
anger, pride, and guilt, which in turn affected behavioral intentions to repair the damage or 
punish the wrongdoer. Maitner et al. (2007) obtained similar effects of presenting participants 
with emotion-inducing statements describing their country’s aggressive actions. The degree 
to which these descriptions elicited satisfaction or guilt predicted opposing behavioral 
intentions: to increase or decrease support for future aggression, respectively.   
In sum, research suggests that emotions communicated in intergroup interactions 
predict behavioral intentions to allocate resources. This influence is likely to operate through 
the elicitation of emotions in receivers. In particular, guilt and pride following unfair 
behaviors may have significant and contrasting consequences for intergroup exchanges.  
The Present Research 
The present research focuses on resource allocation in competitive exchanges between 
groups – specifically, after a member of one’s own group fails to reciprocate another group’s 
trust, leading to a sizeable inequality in the two groups’ resources. We investigate how 
emotions expressed in response to such group-serving behavior affect other group members’ 
pride and guilt as well as their subsequent resource allocation decisions. We examine these 
effects for emotions expressed by outgroup members (Study 1) and by ingroup members 
(Study 2). We propose that both ingroup and outgroup emotional responses to ingroup-
serving behavior will affect how other group members feel and consequently act. In accord 
with social appraisal accounts, negative emotions – such as anger or disappointment – 
expressed by the victim outgroup, and signaling the negative impact of the trust violation, 
should influence ingroup members’ evaluations of how the group has behaved and their 
willingness to reduce the inequality between groups. Correspondingly, emotions expressed by 
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ingroup members – such as happiness or guilt – are likely to emphasize either the ingroup’s 
superiority or the costs imposed on the outgroup by this behavior.  
We therefore examine how ingroup members’ pride and guilt are affected by anger 
and disappointment expressed by an outgroup member (Study 1) and by happiness and guilt 
expressed by the ingroup perpetrator (Study 2). We focus on these emotions because of their 
relevance in resource allocation (e.g., Bosman & van Winden, 2002; Lelieveld et al., 2013; 
Maitner et al., 2007; Solak et al., 2016; van Kleef, de Dreu, & Manstead, 2004; van Kleef, de 
Dreu, & Manstead, 2006) and because their consequences appear to vary depending on 
whether the person expressing them is an ingroup or outgroup member (e.g., Lelieveld et al., 
2013).  
We hypothesize that emotional reactions to an ingroup member’s selfish behavior 
communicated by an ingroup or outgroup member will affect other group members’ 
subsequent allocations. We also hypothesize that this effect will be mediated by changes in 
group members’ feelings of guilt and pride. Specifically, emotion expressions that elicit 
lower levels of pride and higher levels of guilt in ingroup members should lead them to share 
more resources in subsequent intergroup interactions, thereby softening the negative impact 
of the prior breach of trust.   
To test these predictions, we conducted two laboratory experiments using an 
interactive trust game (Berg, Dickhaut, & McCabe, 1995) adapted for an intergroup context. 
Within the game, we manipulated the emotions expressed by a representative of either the 
outgroup (Study 1) or the ingroup (Study 2), following an unfair exchange benefitting the 
ingroup in a competitive intergroup setting (Benton & Druckman, 1974; Folmer et al., 2012). 
To examine how emotional experience was affected by ingroup and outgroup expressions, we 
measured perceivers’ feelings of pride and guilt before asking them to play a second round of 
the game with another member of the outgroup. We then examined how resource allocations 
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in this second round varied as a function of ingroup and outgroup members’ reactions to 
unfairness and participants’ own feelings of pride and guilt.  
Study 1 
Study 1 focused on the impact of an outgroup member’s emotional reaction to an 
ingroup member’s trust-violating behavior.  In particular, we investigated how the 
communication of anger or disappointment affected participants' pride and guilt as well as 
their subsequent resource allocation to an outgroup member. Both anger and disappointment 
are plausible reactions to unfairness (Keltner, Ellsworth, & Edwards, 1993; Lelieveld et al., 
2013) but elicit contrasting reactions and perceptions. Disappointment – like sadness – is a 
help-seeking emotion that elicits sympathy but may also convey weakness and dependency 
(Keltner & Kring, 1998; Lelieveld et al., 2013). Its effects may differ depending on the 
emotion it elicits in the receiver: If communicated disappointment elicits guilt, subsequent 
behavior is likely to be prosocial; if it does not elicit guilt, more selfish behavior is likely to 
follow (Lelieveld et al., 2013).  
Unlike disappointment, anger conveys toughness and high limits in negotiations and 
economic exchanges, often leading to better outcomes for the expresser than other emotions 
such as happiness or disappointment (Lelieveld et al., 2013; Van Kleef et al., 2004). It 
indicates that goals have been hindered and that the expresser blames someone else for it 
(Smith, Haynes, Lazarus, & Pope, 1993). Research on group-based anger (de Vos, van 
Zomeren, Gordijn, & Postmes, 2013) suggests that this emotion may also improve intergroup 
outcomes by communicating the importance of the relationship between groups and 
decreasing destructive conflict intentions.  Moreover, as with disappointment, existing 
literature suggests that the effects of anger depend on the emotional reaction it elicits in the 
receiver (e.g., Lelieveld, Van Dijk, Van Beest, & Van Kleef, 2012).  
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Because both disappointment and anger can lead to positive social outcomes and 
because the social effects of these two emotions appear to depend on the feelings they evoke 
in receivers, we hypothesized that resource allocations to the outgroup would differ 
depending on the extent to which participants responded to the outgroup’s disappointment 
and anger with pride or guilt. Consistent with previous research (Lelieveld et al., 2013), we 
predicted that outgroup disappointment would increase allocations only to the extent that it 
induced guilt in participants. Conversely, since outgroup anger signals norm violation (de 
Vos et al., 2013) and may constitute a threat to the common resource pool (Bosman & van 
Winden, 2002), it should reduce participants’ positive feelings about their group’s 
competitive advantage without eliciting guilt. We therefore predicted that increases in guilt 
and decreases in pride should encourage higher allocations, with outgroup disappointment 
increasing guilt, and outgroup anger decreasing pride. 
Method 
Participants and design. Eighty-five participants (50 females, Mage = 21.70, SD = 
5.10) were recruited in groups during lab sessions (for a total of 16 sessions over six weeks) 
and paid £5 for their time. The study received ethical approval from the Central University 
Research Ethics Committee at the University of Oxford (R47094/RE001). We recruited as 
many participants as we could and excluded data from 18 of them: ten who did not answer 
three questions checking the understanding of the trust game1 and eight who did not complete 
the experiment due to a computer error (final N = 67).  Statistical analyses were conducted 
only when data collection was completed, after the 16 planned lab sessions. The study used a 
between-subjects design, with three outgroup emotion conditions (anger: n = 23; 
disappointment: n = 24; control: n = 20).   
Procedure.  We implemented the study in Qualtrics (Provo, UT). Participants were 
recruited in groups of 4 to 10 and worked at separate computer stations in the same room. 
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After providing consent, they completed an association test (Doosje, Spears & Koomen, 
1995) that ostensibly divided them into two groups by identifying inductive and deductive 
thinkers. The questionnaire asked participants to indicate which item (of the four provided) 
they most closely associated with each of 7 words and 7 numbers. Members of the two 
groups then played a trust game (Berg et al., 1995) to gain lottery tickets for their respective 
teams. The goal was to maximize the group’s tickets thus increasing the chances of winning a 
lottery prize of £100. The trust game itself involved an ‘investor’ transferring lottery tickets 
to a ‘trustee.’ The number of tickets transferred was then tripled, and the trustee could 
theoretically return any proportion of this new total to the investor. Note that investors in trust 
games risk exploitation by trustees who are not compelled to repay; however, if investors 
transfer sufficient resources and trustees reciprocate, both parties end up better off than at the 
start of the game.  
After reading the instructions, participants were informed that their team would act as 
trustees and that one member of their group would play a ‘demonstration round’ with 
someone from the other team (supposedly to help them learn the rules of the game). They 
then read a message stating that another member of their team had been selected to play and 
that that they would be shown what was happening on this person’s screen during the 
demonstration round. After a short waiting time, ostensibly to establish a computer 
connection, participants watched what they believed was the real-time trust game but was in 
fact a pre-recorded screen capture.  
The representatives of both teams started the game with an initial endowment of 10 
lottery tickets, which could be increased or decreased depending on players’ decisions. The 
video showed the ingroup representative receiving 7 tickets (then tripled to 21) and 
subsequently returning 0 tickets to the other team. After this breach of trust, the ingroup 
representative received a message from the other player, reporting how this person felt about 
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the round. The message stated either “I am angry about the round” (anger condition), or “I am 
disappointed about the round” (disappointment condition). In the control condition, the 
ingroup representative did not receive a message from the outgroup representative.  
After observing the demonstration round, participants rated the extent to which they 
felt proud and guilty, using 7-point Likert scales running from 1 (Not at all) to 7 (Extremely). 
These items were presented along with five other items (interested, enthusiastic, upset, happy, 
and attentive; see also Supplementary Materials, Table S1), which served as fillers. 
Participants then played a second round of the game with another member of the outgroup 
team. In this round, they were informed that they had received 4 tickets (tripled to 12) from 
the outgroup player and were asked to decide how many of their resulting 22 tickets (10 
initial tickets + 12 received from the other player) to return. The number of tickets sent to the 
outgroup member provided the main dependent measure of resource allocation. 
After the second round, participants were asked to think back to the demonstration 
round and rate their responsibility for and feeling of guilt about the outcome, and how much 
they had wanted to compensate and make amends for it. They also rated how fairly the 
ingroup representative had behaved in the demonstration round, and how much they had in 
common with ingroup and outgroup members. To respond, participants made ratings on 
scales ranging from 1 (Not at all, or Very little) to 5 (Very much). Three items tested 
participants’ understanding of the trust game, and, in the anger and disappointment 
conditions, one open-ended question asked about the emotion communicated by the outgroup 
member. Finally, participants completed the Test of Self-Conscious Affect (TOSCA, 
Tangney, Wagner, & Gramzow, 1989) and the ‘slider’ measure of Social Value Orientation 
(Murphy, Ackermann, & Handgraaf, 2011). After finishing the questionnaire, they were 
thanked and debriefed. One of the 16 sessions was randomly selected and the 4 participants in 
this session shared the £100 lottery prize.   
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Results2 
Manipulation checks. Participants rated the fairness of the ingroup representative as 
significantly lower than 3, the scale midpoint, M = 1.53, SD = 1.01, t(66) = -11.81, p < .001. 
These ratings did not vary as a function of outgroup emotion, F(2, 63) = 2.13, p = .13, η2p = 
.06.  
Responses to the open-ended question asking about the emotion communicated by the 
outgroup member were coded as instances of anger (if they contained the word “anger” or 
“angry”) or as disappointment (if they contained the word “disappointment” or 
“disappointed”) by two independent judges (in complete agreement, all κs = 1.00, ps < .001). 
Two subsequent chi-square tests revealed that participants reported perceiving anger more 
frequently in the anger (78%) than in the disappointment condition (4.2%), χ2 (1, N = 47) = 
26.77, p <.001, and perceiving disappointment more frequently in the disappointment 
condition (79%) than in the anger condition (0%), χ2 (1, N = 47) = 30.56, p <.001. 
Resource allocation. Allocations in the second round were significantly affected by 
outgroup emotion, F(2, 64) = 3.25, p = .045, η2p = .09,3 showing that participants sent more 
tickets in the anger condition (M = 6.17, SD = 2.92) than in the control condition (M = 3.70, 
SD = 3.96), p = .06 (Tukey HSD), 95% CI [-5.01, .06]. The allocations made in the 
disappointment condition (M = 4.12, SD = 3.49) did not differ from those made in the control 
condition, p = .91, or from those made in the anger condition, p = .11.   
Pride. Feelings of pride were also affected by outgroup emotion, F(2,64) = 3.31, p = 
.04, η2p = .09, such that participants felt less pride in the anger condition (M = 1.56, SD = 
1.04) than in the control condition (M = 2.65, SD = 1.69), p = .04, 95% CI [.04, 2.12]. The 
difference between the control and disappointment conditions (M = 2.29, SD = 1.49 and 
between the two emotion conditions were not significant (p = .68, p = .19, respectively). 
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We conducted an indirect effects analysis to investigate whether the effect of 
outgroup anger on resource allocation was mediated by diminished feelings of pride (Hayes, 
2013).4 Outgroup anger (compared to the control condition) was a significant positive 
predictor of allocations, B = 2.47, F(1,64) = 5.47, p = .02, and a significant negative predictor 
of pride, B = -1.08, F(1,64) = 6.24, p = .01. When participants’ allocations were regressed on 
outgroup anger and self-reported pride, the effect of diminished pride remained significant, B 
= -0.87, F(1,63) = 9.19, p = .003, 95% CI [-1.44, -.30], but the direct effect of outgroup anger 
was no longer significant, B = 1.53, F(1,63) = 2.15, p = .15, 95% CI [-.55, 3.62]. In addition, 
the indirect effect of outgroup anger through participants’ diminished feelings of pride was 
significant, B = .94, 95% CI [.18, 2.25], estimated with 5000 bootstrap resamples. 
Guilt and guilt-related appraisals. Participants’ ratings of guilt were not influenced 
by outgroup emotion. Similarly, the guilt and guilt-related appraisal ratings (willingness to 
compensate and responsibility for the outcome of the first round) measured after the second-
round allocation were not significantly affected by emotion condition, Fs < 1, ns.  
Discussion 
In this study, we investigated the effects of emotions expressed by an outgroup 
member on participants’ own emotions and subsequent resource allocation. Following an 
ingroup member’s selfish behavior, an outgroup member communicated anger, 
disappointment, or no emotion via a written message. Results revealed that participants sent 
more tickets when the outgroup member communicated anger than when no emotion was 
communicated. In other words, anger increased the level of resources shared with the 
outgroup. Further, the effect of anger on allocations was mediated by diminished feelings of 
pride, suggesting that participants’ pride about the ingroup advantage decreased when the 
outgroup expressed anger. Outgroup anger did not affect participants’ guilt or their feelings 
of responsibility for the behavior of the ingroup member. These results are consistent with 
EMOTIONS AND INTERGROUP REPARATION  16 
 
social appraisal accounts (e.g., Manstead & Fischer, 2001), suggesting that emotion and 
behavior in intergroup exchanges partly depend on the emotions expressed by members of 
the other group.  In particular, outgroup anger appears to have reduced participants’ positive 
orientation to the behavior of the ingroup trustee, resulting in diminished pride and higher 
reparation. Together with previous research investigating the role of anger in negotiations 
(e.g. van Kleef et al., 2004) and following intergroup transgressions (de Vos et al., 2013), our 
findings suggest that expressions of this emotion can lead to positive social outcomes and 
improve exchanges between groups following unfair behaviors. Specifically, after a failure to 
reciprocate trust, emotions expressed by an outgroup can increase the allocation of resources 
to the outgroup, which is in turn likely to help repair trust between the two groups. In accord 
with previous research, individuals may increase their allocations in order to soften the 
negative implications of transgressions by other ingroup members (Gino, Gu, & Zhong, 
2009). 
Interestingly, expressions of outgroup disappointment following the ingroup 
member’s behavior did not increase guilt and did not affect participants’ allocations. This is 
consistent with Lelieveld and colleagues’ (2013) earlier finding that expressed 
disappointment only elicited cooperative behavior when it evoked guilt. In their research, 
guilt was only elicited when disappointment was communicated in individual (versus 
representative) negotiations or by an ingroup (versus outgroup) member. In the current study, 
disappointment was communicated by a single outgroup member to another supposed 
member of the ingroup and not directly to participants themselves. Thus, consistent with 
previous research (Lelieveld et al., 2012; Lelieveld et al., 2013), the absence of an effect on 
allocations in the disappointment condition is likely due to the fact that outgroup 
communication of this emotion did not increase participants’ guilt. It should also be 
acknowledged that the sample size in this study was low due to logistical constraints, making 
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it possible that expressions of disappointment did not affect participants’ allocations or 
feelings of guilt because of insufficient statistical power. Given that we determined in 
advance the testing schedule for data collection and did not analyze participants’ responses 
until all sessions were completed, it is unlikely that the significant effects of anger are 
inflated (Kühberger, Fritz, & Scherndl, 2014). In sum, while the findings of Study 1 provide 
intriguing insights into the role of anger in intergroup settings, they deserve to be replicated 
in confirmatory research using a larger sample size.   
The results of Study 1 show that emotions communicated following group-serving 
actions can influence subsequent intergroup exchanges. The emotion in this experiment was 
communicated by the outgroup, but there are good reasons for believing that the emotional 
reaction of the ingroup member who engaged in group-serving behavior should also affect 
resource allocation. Ingroup members’ emotions – especially those expressed by the person 
who engaged in the unfair behavior – are likely to affect how participants feel and 
consequently act. For example, recent evidence reveals that positive or negative emotions 
displayed by someone who has acted unfairly influence observers’ economic decisions by 
communicating how the expresser appraises the unfair act and by reinforcing (or 
undermining) social norms of cooperation and fairness (van der Schalk et al., 2015). These 
effects, observed in interpersonal settings, should also operate during interactions between 
groups. Therefore, Study 2 focused on the influence of emotions expressed by the 
transgressing ingroup member on subsequent resource allocation. 
Study 2 
 Study 2 manipulated emotions expressed by the ingroup rather than the outgroup, and 
again investigated the mediation of their effects on participants’ allocations by participants’ 
own experiences of pride and guilt. We extended the methods used in Study 1 to create a 
more immersive paradigm to investigate participants’ reactions in a similar trust-game 
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context. In this study, the ingroup member’s group-serving behavior was enacted by a 
confederate, posing as another participant. The confederate was (apparently randomly) 
selected to play a ‘demonstration round’ of the trust game. In this round, she engaged in the 
same group-serving behavior as seen in Study 1. She then communicated verbal and 
nonverbal expressions of either guilt or happiness.  
 By expressing guilt, an ingroup member emphasizes the harm done to the outgroup 
and implicitly conveys a negative appraisal of their own behavior towards that outgroup. 
According to social appraisal accounts (e.g., Manstead & Fischer, 2001; Parkinson, 2011), 
this communication should affect how other ingroup members feel about the situation. 
Specifically, we predicted that guilt expressed by the ingroup representative would evoke 
guilt in participants and thereby increase cooperation (Baumeister et al., 2014). Van der 
Schalk and colleagues (2015) found that participants who observed another individual 
expressing regret about unfair resource allocation decisions expected to feel a similar emotion 
if they were to behave in the same way, thus encouraging greater fairness in their own 
resource allocation decisions. These findings suggest that regret about acting unfairly 
establishes a social norm of fairness and sharing. We predicted that expressions of guilt by 
the ingroup representative would have a similar effect, but only to the extent that they 
increased participants’ own feelings of guilt.  
The possible outcomes of expressing happiness following group-serving behavior are 
less clear-cut. The most straightforward prediction – in line with the findings of van der 
Schalk et al. (2015) – is that expressing happiness will serve to frame the intergroup 
exchange as competitive, one in which it is normative to act in a way that favors one’s own 
group. In this case, expressed happiness should increase pride and decrease resource 
allocation. Indeed, expressions of happiness in relation to an action resulting in ingroup 
benefit may be interpreted by other group members as satisfaction or pride, potentially 
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increasing participants’ support for the confederate’s unfair behavior (e.g., Harth et al., 2013; 
Maitner et al., 2007). We therefore predict that the effects of the ingroup representative’s 
happiness on allocation behavior will depend on the extent to which it elicits pride in 
participants.  
In summary, Study 2 manipulated ingroup reactions to the same group-serving 
behavior enacted in Study 1 to investigate whether they would evoke pride or guilt in ingroup 
members and thereby influence allocations in subsequent exchanges with outgroup members. 
As in Study 1, we predicted that the influence of emotion expressions on participants’ 
allocations would be mediated by participants’ own feelings of pride and guilt. Emotion 
expressions eliciting lower pride and higher guilt should increase participants’ allocations. 
Conversely, emotion expressions evoking greater pride and lower guilt should reduce 
allocations.     
Method 
Participants and design. The study was approved by the ethics committee of Cardiff 
University's School of Psychology (EC.14.10.14.3866). One hundred and sixty-four 
participants (139 females, Mage = 18.43, SD = 0.82) were recruited in groups of two or three 
persons (for a total of 60 sessions) and compensated with course credit. We recruited as many 
participants as we could during a 3-week period, aiming for at least 53 usable data points in 
each condition to ensure 80% statistical power to detect a medium-sized effect (f = 0.25) in a 
between-subjects ANOVA. We excluded data from 17 participants: three who did not follow 
experimental instructions, one who reported having participated in a similar experiment in the 
past, and 14 who did not correctly answer the three questions checking the understanding of 
the trust game (final N = 147). The study used a between-subjects design, where each group 
was randomly allocated to one of the three ingroup emotion conditions (guilt: n = 53; 
happiness: n = 47; control: n = 47).  
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Procedure. The procedure was similar to Study 1 but used a more immersive 
paradigm. Each 2- or 3-person group was accompanied by one of two female confederates 
who posed as a fellow participant.  
Participants were first informed that they would be interacting with another group of 
students. The two groups had ostensibly been recruited on the basis of participants’ scores on 
a prior survey. To reinforce the impression that participants were interacting with another 
team, the experimenter appeared to communicate by telephone with a colleague who was 
supervising the other group. After providing written consent, participants were left alone in 
the room for 10 minutes with the task of selecting a name for their group. This task served as 
an icebreaker designed to increase group cohesion. 
As in Study 1, participants next played a ‘demonstration round’ in order to learn the 
rules of the game. The experiment was implemented in MediaLab (version 2012.4.133, New 
York, NY: Empirisoft Corporation). Participants gathered around the computer, which 
selected (supposedly at random) one representative from each of the two teams. In reality, the 
confederate was always selected as the ingroup representative. She sat at the computer and 
ensured that other group members standing behind her could read the trust game instructions 
on the screen. As in Study 1, the participant’s team acted as trustees, while the other team 
acted as investors. After receiving 7 tickets (tripled to 21) from the outgroup member, the 
confederate decided not to return any tickets to the other team. In the guilt and happiness 
conditions, the program asked the confederate how guilty and happy she felt about the 
number of tickets returned to the other group. The confederate answered the question 
following a standardized script. In the guilt condition she sighed, looked down, and said 
“Now I don’t feel so good about it,” before selecting the response very much for guilt and a 
little for happiness. In the happiness condition, she laughed, nodded her head, and said “I feel 
pretty good about it,” then selected the response very much for happiness, and a little for 
EMOTIONS AND INTERGROUP REPARATION  21 
 
guilt. In the control condition, the ingroup representative was not asked about how she felt 
and did not express any emotion.  
Next, participants moved to another room and sat at separate workstations. There, 
they reported the extent to which they felt proud and guilty after the demonstration round, 
using 5-point scales ranging from 1 (Not at all) to 5 (Extremely) in a questionnaire that also 
included four filler items (interested, enthusiastic, upset, and attentive, see also 
Supplementary Materials, Table S2 for details). Participants then played the second round of 
the game with a member of the other group. As in Study 1, they were informed that they had 
received 4 tickets from this other person, and were asked how many of the resulting 22 
tickets they wished to return.5  
As manipulation checks, participants rated the fairness of the decision made by the 
ingroup representative and how happy and positive the representative had felt about it. Then, 
as measures of guilt and guilt-related appraisals, there followed items asking about the extent 
to which participants felt guilty about and responsible for the (unequal) outcome of the 
demonstration round, and how much they had wanted to compensate for it. Participants were 
also asked how much they thought they had in common with other members of their own 
team and with members of the other group. Finally, they answered three screening questions 
testing their understanding of the trust game and completed the TOSCA (Tangney et al., 
1989). They were thanked and debriefed by e-mail. One lottery-winning team was randomly 
selected to share £100 between its members.   
Results 
Similar to Study 1, we examined how emotions expressed by the ingroup member 
(happiness, guilt, control) affected participants’ feelings of pride and guilt and their behavior 
in the second round of the trust game.  
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Manipulation checks. Participants rated the fairness of the ingroup representative as 
significantly lower than 3, the scale midpoint, M = 2.13, SD = 1.12, t(146) = -9.44, p < .001. 
These ratings did not vary as a function of ingroup emotion, F(2,144) =.44, p = .64, η2p < .01.  
Participants’ ratings of the extent to which the ingroup representative was happy were 
significantly influenced by the emotion condition, F(2,144) = 67.53, p < .001, η2p = .48. Post-
hoc comparisons using the Tukey HSD test revealed that happiness ratings were significantly 
lower in the guilt condition (M = 2.23, SD = 0.97) than in the control condition (M = 3.83, SD 
= 0.89), p < .001, 95% CI [1.18, 2.03]. However, the difference between the happiness 
condition (M = 4.17, SD = 0.82) and the control condition was not significant, p = .16.6  
Resource allocation. Participants’ allocations in the second round were significantly 
affected by ingroup emotion, F(2,144) = 3.25, p = .04, η2p = .04.7  Participants sent 
significantly more tickets in the guilt condition (M = 4.02, SD = 2.73) than in the control 
condition (M = 2.77, SD = 2.19), p = .03, 95% CI [.07, 2.43]. There were no significant 
differences between the happiness (M = 3.26, SD = 2.47) and control conditions, p = .61, or 
between the happiness and guilt conditions, p = .28.   
Pride. Feelings of pride were marginally significantly influenced by ingroup emotion, 
F(2,144) = 2.93, p = .06, η2p = .04, such that participants were less proud in the guilt (M = 
1.72, SD = 0.84) than in the control condition (M = 2.19, SD = 1.30), p = .06, 95% CI [-.01, 
.96]. The difference between the control and happiness conditions (M = 1.81, SD = 0.90) was 
not significant, p = .17, and nor was the difference between the two emotion conditions, p = 
.90.  
Mediation analysis revealed that expressions of guilt by the ingroup representative 
(compared to the control condition) significantly increased participants’ allocations, B = 1.25, 
F(1,144) = 6.34, p = .01, and significantly reduced their feelings of pride, B = -0.47, F(1,144) 
= 5.34, p = .02. There was a tendency for participants’ diminished feelings of pride to predict 
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participants’ allocations when controlling for emotion condition, B = -.35, F(1,143) = 3.09, p 
= .08, 95% CI [-.75, .04]. The direct effect of guilt emotion condition on participants’ 
allocations remained significant in this joint regression model, B = 1.09, F(1,143) = 4.66, p = 
.03, 95% CI [.09, 2.08]. However, the indirect effect of condition through diminished pride 
was significant when estimated with 5000 bootstrap resamples, B = .17, 95% CI [.001, .52], 
suggesting partial mediation.  
Guilt and guilt-related appraisals. Feelings of guilt were significantly affected by 
ingroup emotion, F(2,144) = 4.64, p = .01, η2p = .06, such that participants felt more guilty in 
the guilt condition (M = 2.91, SD = 1.23) than in the control condition (M = 2.21, SD = 1.02), 
p = .008, 95% CI [.15, 1.23]. Neither the difference between control and happiness conditions 
(M = 2.64, SD = 1.15), p = .17, nor the difference between the two emotion conditions was 
significant, p = .47. Participants’ ratings of guilt and guilt-related appraisals after second 
round allocations were not predicted by emotion condition, Fs < 1.6, ns. 
Mediation analysis showed that expressions of guilt by the ingroup representative 
(compared to the control condition) significantly predicted participants’ allocations, B = 1.25, 
F(1,144) = 6.34, p = .01, and their own feelings of guilt, B = 0.69, F(1,144) = 9.20, p = .003. 
Participants’ guilt remained a significant predictor of their allocations in a joint regression 
model controlling for emotion condition, B = 0.97, F(1,143) = 35.45, p < .001, 95% CI [.65, 
1.29], but the effect of emotion condition on allocations was no longer significant, B = .58, 
F(1,143) = 1.58, p = .21, 95% CI [-.33, 1.49]. The indirect effect of condition through self-
reported feelings of guilt was significant when estimated with 5000 bootstrap resamples, B = 
.67, 95% CI [.26, 1.23], consistent with full mediation.  
Discussion 
 In Study 2 we examined the effect of an ingroup member’s expressed emotions on 
participants’ pride, guilt, and allocation behavior. As predicted, the results indicated that guilt 
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expressed by an ingroup member who had engaged in group-serving behavior led participants 
to make higher allocations to an outgroup game partner in a subsequent round, compared to 
no emotion. The effect of guilt expression on allocations was fully mediated by participants’ 
own experienced guilt. This pattern of findings is in line with social appraisal accounts 
(Manstead & Fischer, 2001). There was also evidence, albeit weaker, that the ingroup 
member’s guilt expression reduced subjective pride about the ingroup’s behavior and thereby 
increased allocations to the outgroup. This finding mirrors the results of Study 1, where lower 
levels of participants’ pride also increased resource allocation to the outgroup.  
There was no evidence that ingroup expression of happiness influenced pride, guilt, or 
participants’ allocations. As noted earlier, previous research shows that seeing someone 
expressing positive emotion after an unfair behavior increases the likelihood of the observer 
acting unfairly (van der Schalk et al., 2015). We therefore expected that seeing the 
representative’s happiness following a group-serving behavior would increase participants’ 
pride, and decrease both guilt and resource allocation. It is possible that the initial low 
allocation of the ingroup representative in the demonstration round, combined with the 
intergroup setting (Folmer et al., 2012), established a particularly competitive social norm, 
leading to participants’ low allocations in the control condition. The influence of happiness 
might therefore be stronger if the emotion expression followed a less extreme instance of 
unfair behavior. Alternatively, general fairness norms (Gintis, 2000; Hamlin et al., 2011) may 
have made it hard for participants to share the confederate’s apparent happiness following 
trust-violating behavior. A third, possibly related explanation for the lack of effect in the 
happiness condition is that it failed to produce significantly higher perceptions of confederate 
happiness than the control condition. This suggests that future research will need to use 
stronger manipulations of happiness.  
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General Discussion 
In two studies, we demonstrated the impact of communicated emotions on resource 
allocation in intergroup transactions. Emotions communicated by both outgroup (Study 1) 
and ingroup (Study 2) members following group-serving behavior by an ingroup member 
influenced the amount of resources that participants subsequently transferred to the outgroup. 
In Study 1, we showed that when an outgroup representative communicated anger, compared 
to no emotion, ingroup members experienced less pride, and subsequently made higher 
allocations to the outgroup. In Study 2, we found that when an ingroup representative 
expressed guilt, participants felt more guilty and less proud, and made higher allocations to 
the outgroup than when that ingroup representative expressed no emotion. Together, these 
findings highlight the importance of emotion expressions in intergroup relations and suggest 
a mechanism whereby these emotions can shape intergroup trust and behavior. Specifically, 
the results of our mediation analyses suggest that intergroup emotions affect intergroup 
resource allocation by reducing feelings of pride or increasing feelings of guilt in group 
members.  
We focused on these emotions because they reflect opposing reactions to ingroup 
advantage (Hart et al., 2008, 2013; Maitner et al., 2007). This advantage can be framed as 
legitimate and therefore as a basis for increased pride (Tangney et al., 2007; van der Schalk et 
al., 2012); or as illegitimate, and therefore as a basis for reduced pride and increased guilt 
(Brown et al., 2008; Baumeister et al., 1994; Tangney & Dearing, 2003). The results of the 
two studies strongly suggest that emotions communicated by ingroup or outgroup members in 
reaction to parochial group-serving behavior encourage a pride-reducing or guilt-enhancing 
framing of this behavior.  
Our findings are consistent with social appraisal accounts of emotion (e.g., Manstead 
& Fischer, 2001; van der Schalk et al., 2015), and clarify the processes by which emotion 
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expressions influence other people’s resource-allocation decisions and shape trust between 
groups. Specifically, both anger expressed by an outgroup member and guilt expressed by an 
ingroup member appear to encourage higher allocations and reinforce fairness. Anger 
expressed by a disadvantaged outgroup member threatens ingroup interests by signaling 
readiness to confront (Leach, 2016), thereby threatening the opportunity to maximize the 
common resource pool, whereas guilt expressed by a trust-violating ingroup member draws 
participants’ attention to the breach of moral standards (Baumeister et al., 1994). In our 
research, expressions of these emotions caused a decrease in participants’ feelings of pride 
and an increase in their feelings of guilt, respectively. Consistent with previous evidence 
(e.g., Harth et al., 2013; Lelieveld et al., 2013), these changes in participants’ emotional state 
predicted the amount of resources they sent to the harmed group. Our findings also support 
previous research on anger (de Vos et al., 2013; van Kleef et al., 2004) by suggesting that 
expression of this emotion can improve relations between groups in potentially conflictual 
situations following breaches of trust. Whether this influence is due to anger communicating 
the importance of the relationship or presenting strategic information about thwarted personal 
gains is an issue to be explored in future research.  
Although outgroup expressions of anger and ingroup expressions of guilt were 
effective in influencing ingroup emotions and behavior, the same was not true of outgroup 
expressions of disappointment or ingroup expressions of happiness. As noted earlier, 
disappointment is a weaker emotion than anger, in that it implies a less antagonistic stance, 
and it seems that, when expressed by the disadvantaged outgroup, it is insufficient to change 
ingroup emotions or behavior (Lelieveld et al., 2013). Regarding ingroup expressions of 
happiness about the group-serving behavior, we noted earlier that such expressions could 
signal pleasure at the ingroup’s advantage and/or pleasure at the outgroup’s disadvantage. 
The former might provide a basis for increased pride, while the latter might provide a basis 
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for increased guilt. This ambiguity about the object of the ingroup member’s expressed 
happiness might help to explain why it did not result in significant changes in ingroup 
emotions or behavior.  Future studies could assess the effects of more object-specific emotion 
communications. 
It is worth noting that previous studies of intergroup guilt and pride have tended to 
assess these emotions using self-reports of feelings about past wrongdoings of one’s national 
ingroup towards other groups (e.g., Brown et al., 2008; Harth et al., 2008, Iyer, Schmader, & 
Lickel, 2007; McGarty et al., 2005; Swim & Miller, 1999). In these studies, reparative actions 
are typically indexed by behavioral intentions (e.g., Doosje et al., 1998), attitudes towards 
affirmative action (Swim & Miller, 1999), or evaluations of official apologies (McGarty et 
al., 2005). A strength of the current research is that we measured actual behavioral outcomes 
indexed by participants’ economic decisions. We also manipulated intergroup behavior and 
assessed feelings of pride and guilt in a live and dynamic setting, using the trust game – a 
flexible experimental tool that models the features of actual intergroup contexts and thereby 
enables a controlled study of the variables affecting behavior in natural circumstances 
(Bornstein, 2003).  The present findings are consistent with those from studies that examine 
the links between feelings about group behavior and behavioral intention in real-world groups 
(e.g., Brown et al., 2008, Harth et al., 2013, Solak et al., 2016).  
Importantly, the effects of emotion communication in the present research were found 
in a quasi-minimal group context, where the groups were approximately 15 minutes old by 
the time the intergroup trust game started. The use of minimal groups is both a limitation and 
a strength of the present studies. We modeled violations of trust between new groups, without 
a history of previous interactions, which arguably reduces the ecological validity of the study. 
Intergroup emotions are best understood in context (Leach, 2016), because the history of 
intergroup relations likely impacts the effects of communicated emotions. Groups may have a 
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neutral, cooperative, or conflictual history (de Vos et al., 2013). The present studies model a 
cooperative or neutral intergroup context, and the use of a minimal group paradigm in a 
laboratory study provides a conservative test of the effects of emotions in these intergroup 
settings. It is therefore noteworthy that the emotion expression manipulation administered in 
this setting had a significant impact on emotions and behavior in both studies. Arguably, 
these effects would be even stronger in natural groups that provide the basis for significant 
aspects of one’s identity. Specifically, the positive effects of anger in Study 1 and guilt in 
Study 2 should be stronger, as should the effect of the happiness condition in Study 2, when 
there is a valued relationship and a more pronounced distinction between ingroup and 
outgroup. However, for groups with a history of conflict, expressed anger and guilt may have 
a less positive effect, and expressed happiness in Study 2 might elicit more unfair behavior.  
Accordingly, investigating how observers’ guilt and pride affect economic decisions 
in natural groups is a promising avenue for future research. Another promising direction for 
future research is to assess participants’ perceptions of the appropriateness or legitimacy of 
the emotional reactions of the ingroup and the outgroup representatives. Ratings of ingroup 
reactions to unfairness may be especially informative in providing insights into the 
phenomenon of emotional nonconformity, its boundary conditions, and its potential to shape 
economic behavior (Goldenberg, Saguy, & Halperin, 2014). In the current research, ingroup 
happiness did not significantly affect participants’ reactions. However, it is possible that in 
the context of real-world groups and a more serious transgression, displays of ingroup 
happiness following such violation would have elicited guilt and increased resource 
allocation.  
Given that our ultimate goal is to shed light on how emotional expression can restore 
trust between groups following a group’s failure to reciprocate a trusting move from another 
group, it could be argued that the evidence of trust restoration was rather meager. Even in the 
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conditions in which the outgroup expressed anger, or the ingroup member expressed guilt, the 
mean number of tickets allocated to the outgroup in round 2 was not high in absolute terms, 
leaving a disparity between ingroup and outgroup resources. The strong positive correlation 
between this measure and participants’ willingness to compensate for the outcome of round 1 
observed across both studies (see Supplementary Materials, Table S1and S2) suggests that 
participants’ allocations provide some indication of their reparatory intentions. However, the 
objectively low number of tickets allocated may reflect the inherent difficulty of establishing 
cooperation between groups (Folmer et al., 2012; Folmer, Wildschut, De Cremer, & van 
Lange, 2017) – especially when one group has acted in such a group-serving manner in the 
first round, thereby establishing a social norm of parochial behavior (Fowler & Christakis, 
2010). There was nevertheless a significant impact of emotion, which highlights the fact that 
emotion expressions have the potential to influence intergroup interactions even in the 
context of highly unfair exchanges.    
We believe that this effect of emotion communication is likely to generalize across 
experimental paradigms and shape intergroup exchanges using other economic games. 
Indeed, our results are in accord with studies examining the effects of communicated 
emotions in interpersonal exchanges using the ultimatum game (van der Schalk et al., 2015) 
and negotiation tasks (Lelieveld et al., 2013; van Kleef et al., 2006). Research also 
demonstrates the positive impact of experienced guilt on reparatory behavior in intergroup 
interactions using a variety of paradigms (Doosje et al., 1998; Gino et al., 2009; Harth et al., 
2013). The findings from the current studies suggest that emotions are likely to influence 
resource allocation decisions and intergroup trust in intergroup exchanges through their 
influence on experienced emotion. Importantly, research on guilt in interpersonal settings 
suggests that the beneficial effects of this emotion may depend on perceived spontaneous 
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versus strategic motivations of the expresser (Shore & Parkinson, 2017). Whether this 
influence extends to intergroup settings deserves to be explored in future studies.  
Together, the findings reported here show that the emotions communicated by either 
ingroup or outgroup members following a group-serving move in an intergroup trust game 
shape participants’ own emotional experience and future allocation behavior. This 
demonstrates the importance of communicated emotions in establishing (or re-establishing) 
trust between groups and provides support for the application of social appraisal accounts of 
emotion to intergroup settings. Returning to Adam Smith, we believe that both ingroup and 
outgroup expressions of emotion can remind ingroup members that “when we prefer 
ourselves so shamefully and so blindly to others, we become the proper objects of 
resentment” (III.1.46). Because they have the power to evoke emotional reactions in 
individual and intergroup settings, expressions of emotion can help to create or restore 
cooperation when trust is a scarce resource.  
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Footnotes 
1
 In both studies, at the end of the experimental session, participants answered 3 single-
choice questions to confirm that they understood the task, namely: “Imagine that your Game 
Partner gave you 5 tickets. How many tickets would this person have kept for himself or 
herself?”; “How many tickets did your Game Partner have at the beginning of the game?”; 
and “If your Game Partner gave you 9 tickets, how many tickets would you have had (along 
with the tickets that you received at the beginning of this round)?”. 
2 Correlations between all key dependent variables are reported in the Supplementary 
Materials.  
3
 Including group size, participants’ proneness to guilt (as measured by TOSCA) or Social 
Value Orientation as covariates did not change the pattern of results. The main effect of 
outgroup Emotion on participants’ allocations was significant in all three analyses, F(2, 63) = 
3.13, p = .05, η2p = .09; F (2, 61) = 3.44, p = .038, η2p =.10; F(2, 63) = 3.33, p = .04, η2p = 
.10, respectively. These three measures were not the focus of the present research and will not 
be discussed further. 
4
 Because the emotion factor had three levels, all mediation analyses reported in this paper 
used two dummy variables, comparing each emotion condition with the control condition. 
The variable of interest was entered as the main predictor and the other variable was entered 
as a covariate.   
5
 Due to a programming error, the number of tickets that could be returned was 
constrained to a value between 0 and 10. In practice this error made little difference to the 
results: Participants were not aware of this restriction, only 4 out of 147 participants (2.7%) 
chose to return 10 tickets, and the modal number returned was 2. 
6
 Analysis of participants’ ratings of the representative’s positivity revealed an identical 
pattern of results: There was a significant effect of emotion condition, F(2,144) = 75.14, p < 
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.001, η2p = .51. Ratings were significantly lower in the guilt condition (M = 2.30, SD = 0.75) 
than in the control condition (M = 3.89, SD = 0.84), p <.001, with the difference between the 
happiness condition (M = 4.09, SD = 0.83) and the control condition not being significant, p 
= .48. 
7 The pattern of results remained similar after controlling for participants’ proneness to 
guilt (as measured by TOSCA), F(2,135) = 2.75, p = .07, η2p = .04, and for the confederate’s 
identity, F(2,143) = 3.27, p = .04, η2p = .04. 
 
 
